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his paper is a direct empirical examination of the fundamental claim that use of templates enhances the
effectiveness of knowledge transfer. We explore the effect of template use through an eight-year, in-depth
ﬁeld investigation of Rank Xerox (now Xerox Europe). The ﬁeld investigation covers three sequential transfer
efforts in 15 western European countries. The investigation reveals a naturally occurring, repeated-treatment
quasi experiment that allows us to test the hypothesis that the use of templates enhances the effectiveness of
knowledge transfer. “Observations” in this experiment measure the extent of adoption and performance of the
practice at the recipient units. The “treatment” is the use of a template during the transfer.
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Leveraging knowledge assets within the ﬁrm is fundamental to realizing competitive advantage (Zander
and Kogut 1995, Argote and Ingram 2000). Teece et al.
(1997), echoing Nelson and Winter (1982), suggest
that the most critical knowledge assets are embedded
in organizational routines. A fundamental hypothesis states that the use of templates—actual working
instances of the ﬁrm’s routines—increases the effectiveness of leveraging such assets through transfer
within the ﬁrm (Nelson and Winter 1982, Winter
1995). This claim, however, has been contested to
varying degrees, with some claiming that adherence
to a template decreases performance (e.g., Kostova
1999) and others suggesting that it is sometimes
unnecessary (e.g., Baden-Fuller and Winter 2007).
In this paper, we explore the connection between
template use and the effectiveness of knowledge
transfer through an eight-year, real-time investigation of three transfer efforts—two successful and one
not—within 15 western European countries. The setting for our study is Rank Xerox (now Xerox Europe).
Speciﬁcally, we focus on how relying on a designated
benchmark impacts the extent of adoption of transferred practices and their performance at the recipient site. To this end, we treat the experience as a
naturally occurring, repeated-treatment quasi experiment (Cook and Campbell 1979). In addition, we
probe causal inferences drawn from the experiment
by examining more than a dozen plausible alternative explanations. This paper provides a replicable

measure of template use as well as empirical grounds
for evaluating the fundamental connection between
template use and knowledge transfer effectiveness.

The Advantage of Using Templates

It has been argued that ﬁrm capabilities are often
based on a set of organizational routines (Teece et al.
1997) that embody an important part of a ﬁrm’s
productive knowledge (Nelson and Winter 1982).
Leveraging that knowledge is seen as essential to
realizing competitive advantage (Zander and Kogut
1995). Leveraging such knowledge, as Teece et al.
(1997) argue, often entails reusing it effectively in different settings. Not only does it make economic sense
for a ﬁrm to leverage superior routines by reusing
or copying them rather than recreating them de novo1
in each new setting, but it also makes sense to do
so before competitors do (Nelson and Winter 1982,
Teece et al. 1997, Rivkin 2000). A ﬁrm has an inherent
advantage over potential imitators in reusing its own
routines because it generally has privileged access to
them (Winter 1995). When replicating its own routine,
the ﬁrm can directly observe the routine in its totality.
1
In theory, varying environmental conditions may change the key
success factors of any given routine, rendering it ineffective. However, evidence suggests the advantage of leveraging capabilities via
the replication of successful routines tends to persist despite widely
varying environmental conditions (Ingram and Baum 1997, Jensen
and Szulanski 2004, Szulanski and Jensen 2006).
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An imitator, in most cases, cannot directly observe
the entire routine to be copied and is thus at a disadvantage, especially when imitating less visible, yet
potentially still essential, aspects of a routine.2
Nelson and Winter (1982, pp. 119–120) use the term
template to refer to working examples of organizational
routines. In their conception, templates contain both
critical and noncritical aspects of the routine, providing the details and nuances of how the work gets done,
in what sequence, and how various components and
subroutines are interconnected. Scrutinizing the template not only allows for an examination of factors
that may not be publicly available outside the ﬁrm
but may also increase the likelihood that aspects of
the routine that are tacit (Polanyi 1962) or causally
ambiguous (Lippman and Rumelt 1982) are nonetheless transferred. Because leveraging knowledge assets
through the replication of ﬁrm routines involves recreating productive knowledge from the source site, it
follows that using the original routine as a template
may facilitate knowledge transfer within the ﬁrm.
This claim, however, has been contested to varying
degrees. For instance, international business scholars
suggest that insisting on adhering too closely to a
template decreases transfer effectiveness by inhibiting
local adaptation (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989, Prahalad
and Doz 1987) and increasing local resistance to adoption (Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Baden-Fuller and
Winter (2007) offer two examples of situations where
principles (ideas encapsulating the knowledge to be
transferred) are utilized more effectively in the transfer effort than are templates (working examples of the
knowledge to be transferred). Finally, Rivkin’s (2001)
sobering analysis of the possibility of deriving competitive advantage from reproducing complex knowledge makes little mention of the actual value of using
templates.
Notwithstanding the potential practical and theoretical importance of templates for realizing competitive advantage, systematic empirical evidence of the
effect of templates is scarce. Of special concern is the
absence of an accepted measure of template use.

Measures
Setting
To empirically examine the hypothesis that template
use increases the effectiveness of knowledge transfer,
2
It should be noted that the replication of organizational routines
may not necessarily lead to an increase in performance. Although
we are arguing that the use of templates may increase the effectiveness of knowledge transfer, it is possible that ﬁrms could
replicate routines that achieve substandard results. A successful
transfer in this regard may be effective, yet diminish recipient unit
performance.
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we report on a case study that includes a repeatedtreatment quasi experiment that occurred naturally at
the western European units of Rank Xerox. Under substantial pressure from Xerox headquarters to increase
ﬁnancial performance, Bernard Fournier, then CEO,
launched a series of initiatives in September 1992 to
increase revenue by identifying, documenting, and
transferring best practices associated with sales processes. The initiatives were headed by a team of managers known internally as “Team C.”
Whereas the ﬁrst initiative in the series, referred to
as Wave I (launched early spring 1994), proved successful, the second initiative, Wave II (launched late
autumn 1994), stalled. The third initiative, Wave III,
referred to internally as Telesales (pilot units implemented in autumn of 1995, with general implementation in January 1996), was successful. We investigated
the period from 1992 to 1999.
Data Collection
We followed Yin (1989) in the initial data collection, employing a descriptive case study methodology aimed at accurately describing the three transfers.
This stage of data collection occurred in real time over
the entire eight-year period. The company granted us
full access. Team C’s leader, Carlos Camarero, acted
as host and main informant throughout the entire
period. Camarero facilitated access to all members
of Team C as well as to senior managers of many
of the country business units (CBUs). We visited
headquarters at least once a year and several CBUs
before, during, and after selected interventions. We
also had access to individuals and internal company
documents as required to clarify ongoing ﬁndings.
Data on each “wave” were collected from multiple
data sources, including interviews, direct observation,
company documentation, a survey, and archival data.
After the initial data collection, and once members
of Team C had approved our depiction of events,
we published a set of case studies detailing the three
waves (Szulanski and Casaburi 2004a, b; Szulanski
et al. 2004). At this point we recognized that the data
comprised a naturally occurring, repeated-treatment
quasi experiment following the methodology developed by Cook and Campbell (1979), which would
allow us to test the longstanding and fundamental
hypothesis that template use increases the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. With a ﬁrm hypothesis in mind, we then reapproached our sources to
collect additional data on the independent variable,
template use. We collected additional ﬁrm archival
data consisting of every document the ﬁrm still possessed concerning Team C (nearly 5,000 documents)
and utilized semistructured interviews to focus on the
role of templates (internally referred to as “benchmark units”) in the knowledge transfer process. We
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gathered additional data from the ﬁrm as necessary
to address alternative explanations as they emerged.
The following two sections detail how we measured
template use and the effectiveness of the knowledge
transfer.
Template Use. In line with Nelson and Winter’s
(1982, pp. 119–120) original conception of templates
as working examples, a replication initiative is said
to have used a template when the practice or routine being replicated (1) exists at the time of the
initiative, (2) is composed of a single or connected
series of processes, (3) is observable, and (4) is consciously used in the replication process. A template is
not used if any of these elements is missing; that is,
if the practice is not active, being either dormant
or still an idea that has not yet been implemented
(is not currently observable); if it consists of unconnected pieces (removing the possibility of observing
the interconnections between the subroutines); or if
its existence is ignored during replication.3 In this
paper, template use is indicated by the designation of
benchmark countries that possess the particular routine being transferred and that are explicitly involved
in the replication process.
The Effectiveness of the Knowledge Transfer. We
utilized two measures of knowledge transfer effectiveness. First, we measured the level of adoption of
each initiative by the recipient units. This measure
includes both the number of recipient units adopting the initiative and the level of implementation at
each site. Level of implementation within a particular unit can be affected by other variables, such
as difﬁculty of transfer, but also reﬂects the level of
effort put forth by the recipient. Adoption is a suitable measure of the effectiveness of knowledge transfer because knowledge does not transfer if a recipient
unit does not implement the routine in question. The
level of implementation was measured through internal company assessments of implementation efforts
that were jointly determined by headquarters and the
recipient units. These assessments were taken a year
after implementation efforts began for each transfer
initiative.
Second, we measured the performance of the recipient units after implementation of the transferred routine. If one assumes, as is the case with each template
in this study, that the routine being transferred was
achieving superior results compared to those of the
recipient units, one should expect to see an increase
in performance in the recipient units upon effective
implementation. As such, pre- and post-transfer measures of recipient unit performance are a good gauge
3
Templates do not have to exist solely within a ﬁrm. If an external
routine possesses the above characteristics it may also be considered a template.
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of the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer effort.
Performance was measured by using available quantitative indicators, which included sales force productivity, sales force coverage of potential customers, and
the ratio of selling costs to revenue.

Analysis of the Effect of Template Use

Here we describe the practices comprising the template, or templates, for each wave and the process
used to transfer them. The description of each wave is
followed by a discussion of the results of the measurement of template use and knowledge transfer effectiveness for that wave.
Wave I
Wave I Implementation. The ﬁrst wave of the
Team C initiatives (Wave I) began in 1993, with
the practices being presented for implementation in
early 1994. For Wave I, Team C searched for current,
discrete best practices that could be easily transferred and implemented separately. These best practices would be transferred to other countries, with the
originating country designated as the benchmark that
others could consult and emulate.
Of a total of 40 identiﬁed best practices, Team C
selected 10 that were then validated in situ to ensure
that they did, in reality, produce superior results and
were potentially transferable. The team emerged from
this effort with nine validated best practices for revenue growth.4 Top management dictated that each
country fully implement at least four of the nine.
Team C spent considerable time analyzing the key
success factors underlying the superior results for
each practice, eventually reducing these results to a
manageable number of factors that could be easily
implemented. They prepared and distributed an implementation manual written in easy-to-understand
language. The manual ﬁrst presented the data showing the differences in performance between the benchmark practices and those in other countries and then
detailed the key success factors underlying the practices and how to implement them. The manual also
included contact information for each benchmark site
so that recipient units could contact key, experienced
personnel for help in implementing each practice.
After the manuals were distributed, Team C leaders
visited each of the recipient countries multiple times
to monitor implementation progress and help with
emerging problems.
Wave I Results. According to the deﬁnition of a template as an organizational routine comprising a connected set of processes that are functioning, observable,
4

See the appendix for a description of the Wave I practices.
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Table 1

Extent of Wave I Adoptiona by Practice Where Data Availableb

Practice
MajestiK
Customer retention
Docutech
DocuPrint
New business major accounts
Competitive machine in ﬁeld
Analyst time billing
Secondhand centralized printers
Facilities management services
Percent of target achieved
(4 practices)

Average
38
37
38
35
38
32
37
4
42

United Kingdom Germany Switzerland Austria
Spain
Nordicc
Jan. 1995
Sept. 1995 Dec. 1995 June 1995 Nov. 1995 Sept. 1995
3
3
4
3
5
3
3
4
5

4
4
3
3
—
4
4
5
5

4
4
4
4
3
2
5
5
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
3
1
5

4
4
4
3
5
3
4
4
4

4
3
4
4
2
3
3
5
3

100

150

150

175

175

100

a

Rated on a scale of 1–5 where 1 = no implementation, 2 = planned implementation, 3 = partially implemented with
major work still required for full implementation, 4 = implemented with minor work still required for full implementation,
5 = completely implemented. Concerning the percent of target achieved, Rank Xerox considered 4s and 5s to indicate a
practice having been implemented.
b
All 15 Rank Xerox European countries implemented at least four practices. Implementation data by practice is available
for only nine countries.
c
Nordic is the average for the geographic region comprising Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark.

recurrent sets of behaviors, Wave I clearly used a template, or rather a set of templates. The nine practices
were distinct sales practices, each currently in operation within a particular country unit. That unit was
speciﬁed as a benchmark unit and actively used to
transfer the practice, resulting in a set of nine separate
templates for use in the knowledge transfer process.
Adoption of Wave I practices was high. The countries were required to implement only four of the nine
practices to reach internal implementation targets. All
15 countries involved with the transfers met the goal
of completely implementing at least four practices
within one year. Many implemented more. Table 1
shows the extent of implementation by practice.
Not only was Wave I well implemented, but the
transferred practices also performed strongly in the
recipient units. Overall, in 1994 Wave I replicas generated more than $100 million in additional revenue
across all practices and another nearly $100 million in 1995, far outpacing initial expectations.5 An
example of performance gains was the increase in
unit sales of color copiers attributable to the Wave I
“MajestiK” initiative. Within one year of implementation, Switzerland was selling 328%, The Netherlands
300%, and Norway 152% more copiers (Stewart 1996).
Every transferred practice generated a substantial
increase in revenue beyond the costs of implementation; the costs totaled approximately $1 million, with
the average revenue increase exceeding the ﬁrm’s
5
Although we do not have evidence beyond what is listed here of a
direct link between Wave I and additional revenue, the Rank Xerox
management at the time, which did have data on the direct link,
attributed the additional revenue to implementation of the Wave I
initiative.

target by 154%. Table 2 indicates the aggregate revenue gains attributable to each of the nine practices.
Such increases in performance helped raise the average revenue per salesperson from $368,000 in 1993 to
$400,000 by the end of 1994 (statistically signiﬁcant at
the p < 005 level).
Wave II
Wave II Implementation. Team C was inspired by
the dramatic results of Wave I. Beginning in the second half of 1994, Team C decided to escalate the
exploitation of existing practices to a more sophisticated level by deﬁning an overarching best practice
for the company’s entire sales process. At the core
of the Wave II initiative was the idea of increasing
salesperson coverage of potential customers’ buying
Table 2

Extent of Wave I Success by Initiative

Practice
MajestiK
Customer retention
DocuTech
New business
major accounts
DocuPrint
Competitive machine in ﬁeld
Analyst time billing
Secondhand centralized
printers
Facilities management services
Total
Cumulative total
through 1995

1994 revenue 1994 revenue Percent of
estimate ($M) identiﬁed ($M)
Target
25
10
5
5

45
21
152
52

180
210
304
104

—
10
3
4

45
16
1
26

—
16
33
65

3

4

133

65

100.1
Approx. 191.6

154
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decisions. Traditionally, Rank Xerox had rewarded
salespeople based on the number of copiers sold
per month. This led most salespeople to focus on
current customers rather than prospecting potential
customers. This tactic typically ensured the salespeople adequate sales per month but did not expand
Rank Xerox’s market share, which was approximately
15% in the European market. Internal data, adjusted
for market size and photocopying volume, showed
that countries that focused more heavily on covering potential customers’ buying decisions were substantially more productive.6 Team C concluded that
an overarching best sales practice focused on coverage of buying decisions rather than sales to existing
customers could potentially triple the revenue gains
achieved by Wave I.
Measuring sales productivity by the coverage of
prospective customers instead of the number of
copiers sold, however, entailed a basic shift that
would alter not only how sales activity was measured
but also daily salesperson behaviors and how the
CBUs were assessed. Shifting the focus to coverage
required changing more than just the incentive structure. A focus on coverage also required better territory planning and more intensive use of databases to
track prospects and ensure that salespeople were contacting those clients who were about to replace equipment and who would potentially purchase enough
new equipment to make a sales call worthwhile. Likewise, targeting, lead generation, activity planning,
reporting, monitoring, and training activities had to
be realigned to support the new focus. Ultimately,
nine different interdependent activities, or subprocesses, had to be changed to adequately support the
focus on coverage.
In an effort to replicate the success of Wave I by
again reusing internal knowledge assets, Team C analyzed each of the countries, looking for best practices
that corresponded with one or more of the individual subprocesses. They found these practices scattered
randomly throughout the countries. The assembly of
the best-in-breed sales subprocesses resulted in a composite process that detailed new action plans for each
aspect of the Rank Xerox sales process. The different
subprocesses were considered separate but sequentially interdependent modules that, together, comprised the new “Sales Force Management Activities
Model.” The sequentially interdependent nature of
the modules was made explicit to the CBUs both verbally and in writing.
As with Wave I, an extensive manual was produced, which detailed the superior performance of
6
A few countries, such as Spain and Portugal, already had practices
in place that emphasized some degree of coverage. However, none
of the existing practices, in the eyes of Team C, went far enough.
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the subprocesses, or modules, in the countries where
they were currently in operation and included key
success factors and steps for implementing each subprocess. The book was written in easy-to-understand
language but also in exacting detail that carefully
described the plan for combining the modules into
a coherent and complete new sales process. Once
the manual was ready, it was presented to the management teams of each CBU by Team C leadership
in a series of “road shows” meant to increase motivation for implementing the new practice. As with
Wave I, Team C members traveled extensively during
the implementation process to monitor progress and
to encourage and support implementation.
Wave II Results. Unlike Wave I, Wave II did not
have a template to use. The deﬁnition of a template
requires that a practice be composed of a single or
interconnected series of practices that are observable
and currently in use. The practices being replicated
in Wave II, while existing in separate business units,
did not exist as a uniﬁed, functioning whole in any
one location. Had the transfer consisted of separate,
distinct practices as in Wave I, templates would have
existed for each subprocess. However, the practices
were linked conceptually but had never been tested or
used together before. The new sales process consisted
of highly interdependent modules that, as a whole,
had not been tested and were not in operation, resulting in a transfer without a template. Team C member
Ricardo Morais explains, “We tried to do something
ideal but totally logical. But that thing, with those
pieces, never existed [before] in that way.”
Unlike Wave I, adoption of the new sales practice
was low. Some countries openly refused, but most
feigned enthusiasm while giving implementation only
a token effort.7 Moreover, average sales force coverage, the key metric for Wave II, remained stagnant,
and sales force productivity actually declined. Within
a year of launch, the CEO discontinued the project,
and the CBUs ceased even token attempts to implement it.
Of course, there was at least partial implementation of the new practice in many locations. However, the new sales practice consisted of a series
of nine interdependent modules. For the practice to
operate effectively, all nine modules had to be implemented satisfactorily. Over a year into the implementation effort, only one country, Greece, had sufﬁciently
implemented more than two-thirds of the modules
necessary to operate the Wave II practice. The average level of implementation was under 40%,8 with
7
This is similar to Zbaracki’s (1998) study of TQM adoption in
which managers often engaged in rhetoric that was not followed
by actual implementation of the practice.
8
For comparison purposes, there was 100% implementation of
Wave I. This is calculated as adequate implementation (4 or 5 rating
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Table 3

Extent of Wave II Adoption

Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
The Netherlands
Italy
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Total

Percent of
Percent of
Percent of
Percent of
red modules yellow modules green modules Green
3
2
1
2
0
3
0
0
3
3
0
8
2
0
3

4
2
2
1
7
4
2
4
4
4
3
0
6
4
5

2
5
6
6
2
2
7
5
2
2
6
1
1
5
1

22
56
66
66
22
22
78
56
22
22
66
11
11
56
11

30

52

53

39

more than one country at only 11% completion. Furthermore, upper management suspected that many
who had reported full implementation of speciﬁc
Wave II modules had not actually done so. Instead,
they were believed to have implemented only cosmetic changes in an effort to placate top management
without making the fundamental alterations necessary to fully implement the modules. For instance,
one year into the implementation process, despite
self-reports showing reasonable levels of implementation, only about 10% of the salespeople were actually using the database software central to Wave II
success.9
Table 3 shows the color-coded implementation
self-reports submitted approximately a year after
the Wave II launch. Red indicates critical problems
with implementation. Yellow indicates that signiﬁcant
improvement is required before the practice can be
considered to have been implemented. Green indicates that implementation is satisfactory. The ﬁgures
in the table represent the number of modules in each
color category. A full year into implementation, most
countries had not made much progress.
Wave III—Telesales
Wave III—Telesales Implementation. On a separate assignment during Wave II, the CEO suggested
from Table 1) to fulﬁll the requirement of four practices within one
year. With Wave I all countries adequately implemented all nine
practices within two years. Even if one were to require all nine
practices to be implemented in the ﬁrst year, the implementation
rate would have been 63%, substantially higher than Wave II implementation.
9
This is reported by Camarero and was derived from Team C’s
monitoring of Wave II implementation.
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that Camarero, the head of Team C, visit the Rank
Xerox operations in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Since 1993 the salespeople there had contacted customers mostly by telephone, rather than face-to-face
as was done in Europe, primarily to escape typical
temperatures that exceed 44  C.10 The results, in the
eyes of both the CEO and Camarero, were extraordinary. In late 1994 Camarero visited Dubai to observe
the operations. He was impressed with the results
and, as implementation of Wave II began to falter
in 1995, decided to analyze the Dubai situation further. Although Camarero did not recognize it at the
time, he later realized that the sales practice in Dubai,
called “Telesales,” accomplished almost exactly what
he was trying to do with Wave II and in many of
the same ways. In fact, the Telesales practice in Dubai
focused on coverage and incorporated all nine of
the interdependent submodules of Wave II, with the
exception that three were embedded in a piece of
software. Through using the telephone as the primary
mechanism for customer contacts, the results were
even better than had been expected with Wave II. As
Camarero explained:
We found out that [in Europe] our salespeople were
averaging ten customer visits a day, but only one of
them was effective. This way (i.e., using Telesales) they
could rapidly complete the effective transaction and
had plenty of time left to average 2.5 effective transactions per day, thus doubling their productivity.

Camarero decided to transfer the Telesales practice to the western European countries. Following the
same method used in Waves I and II, he extracted
the key elements of the Dubai practice. He then put
together a manual similar to the one used in both previous waves, detailing the extraordinary performance
of Dubai, describing the key factors of the Telesales
practice, and explaining how to implement it.
The management in Dubai had embedded the
elements having to do with database management,
reporting, and record keeping in a piece of software
called TeleMagic, making integration of those three
aspects of the sales process relatively easy. Team C
considered the information technology (IT) aspect of
the project to be an important enabler. However,
as Team C member Ricardo Morais suggested, he
would never have been able to use IT as an effective enabler for the project if Dubai had not already
been using TeleMagic. Not only did Dubai’s use of
TeleMagic provide the initial impetus for the use
10

The Telesales practice did not begin with Dubai. Dubai transferred the practice from Rank Xerox’s Colombia unit, where the
practice had initiated a year or two prior to Dubai’s adoption in
response to the abduction of two salespeople.
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of IT (the understanding that one could use such
software, which was commercially available, to sell
large copy machines by telephone), but it also provided an understanding of how to successfully connect the software with the less technological aspects
of the Telesales practice. The key success factors,
while including IT, referred to all nine interdependent
subprocesses, and Dubai was used multiple times
as a referent to solve non-IT-related implementation
problems.
For example, after implementation had been under
way for a couple of months, the pilot centers discovered that they did not know how to operate Telesales
for salespeople responsible for key accounts with
major corporations. It did not seem to make sense
to approach large ﬁrms by telephone for sales often
totaling tens of thousands of dollars. In response,
Camarero returned to Dubai. There he found that
those responsible for key accounts used the telephone
as much or more than those responsible for smaller
ﬁrms because the units of large corporations often
bought separately and were headed by people who
were too busy for numerous personal visits.
The Telesales initiative began in late 1995 with a
series of pilot implementations in Lisbon, Birmingham, Lyon, Brussels, and Madrid. To persuade the
managers of these units to undertake the initiative,
Camarero not only shared with them data proving the
superior performance of Dubai but also ﬂew them to
Dubai so they could observe the practice in operation.
The Telesales practice, like Wave II, was considerably
more complex than the practices transferred in Wave I
in that it involved a fundamental restructuring of the
sales force management process that relied on a series
of interdependent modules. Consequently, implementation was not quite as smooth as in Wave I. It took a
few months, along with a number of iterations back
to Dubai to answer unforeseen questions, for the pilot
units to begin to reproduce the superior results found
at Dubai.
After a few months, however, the transferred practice achieved comparable results, and the pilot units
were designated as benchmarks for the rest of the corporation. As he had done in persuading the pilots,
Camarero brought hundreds of managers to the pilot
in Lisbon to observe the operations in an explicit
attempt to increase motivation to adopt the new practice. In Camarero’s view, Telesales materialized the
theoretical model of Wave II. He said, “It was an
opportunistic exercise where theory turned into practice. It allowed potential recipients to see, eat, chew,
and touch the practice. It was seeing with their own
eyes that 2 + 2 = 4, not just being told.”
Wave III—-Telesales Results. Fulﬁlling the requirements of a template, the Telesales practice was,
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at the time of the transfer, observable and in operation as a functioning, complete practice in Dubai.
It was not a set of discrete, independent practices
as in Wave I, but, unlike Wave II, the interdependent subpractices in Telesales were in operation as a
combined whole. As with Wave I, both adoption and
performance were high. Within six months of launch,
the initiative had been fully implemented in all 15
Rank Xerox western European countries. The chairman’s statement in Rank Xerox’s 1996 Annual Report
noted that Telesales signiﬁcantly improved sales coverage (a key Telesales metric) and increased market
share. Within a year of implementation, average sales
coverage had increased by 11% (signiﬁcant at the p <
001 level when lagged to allow for issues of incomplete data for 1996), with some units increasing as
much as 30%. Sales productivity rose accordingly (signiﬁcant at the p < 0001 level), and the ratio of gross
proﬁt to sales expense doubled (signiﬁcant at the p <
0001 level) without the signiﬁcant loss of customers
that might be expected if the practice represented only
short-term sales at the expense of long-term customer
satisfaction.11
Analysis of the Evidence
Table 4 compares key performance metrics for preand post-implementation of the three waves. The
comparison highlights the conclusion that Wave II
was not successful, whereas the other two initiatives
were. Given the size and complexity of the Telesales
initiatives, we include the key metrics lagged one year
as well. Although technically one would expect the
same lagged effect for Wave II, the lack of implementation forestalls any such effect. Because relatively few
CBUs, if any, implemented Wave II to any meaningful
degree, the effects seen in 1996 and 1997 can safely
be related to Telesales, which was fully implemented
within six months of launch. t statistics comparing the
means of the 15 major Rank Xerox European countries
across time periods, as well as p values, are reported
below the metric where available.
Overlaying the patterns of template use, adoption,
and performance discussed above produces the pattern shown in Table 5.
All available indications suggest that template use
and the effectiveness of knowledge transfer efforts are
correlated.
To further our analysis, we treat the evidence as a
naturally occurring, repeated-treatment quasi experiment. We do so to assess the extent to which the
evidence might support the basic claim that template
use enhances the effectiveness of knowledge transfer,
11

They experienced a 1% decline in customer loyalty, which was
attributed to downsizing and ﬂuctuations of customer loyalty in
the industry as a whole.
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Table 4

Wave I, Wave II, and Telesales Performance Metrics Compared Using t-Tests
Pre-Wave I
(1993)

Post-Wave I/
Pre-Wave II (1994)

Post-Wave II/
Pre-telesales (1995)

Post-Telesales
(1996)

Telesales
lagged (1997)

Mean sales coveragea

Not applicable

29.14

29.14
(t 0.00, not sig.)

32.36
(t 2.07, p < 010)

33.11
(t 3.70, p < 001)

Mean sales coverage versus 1994b

Not applicable

30.53

Not applicable

368

400
(t 2.50, p < 005)
1.06

385
(t 1.36, not sig.)
1.19
(t 2.82, p < 001)

33.01
(t 2.50, p < 005)
452
(Not availablec 
Not available

33.89
(t 2.53, p < 005)
481
(t 4.74, p < 0001)
2.02
(t 7.89, p < 0001)

Mean direct sales revenue/salesperson
(in thousands)
Mean ratio of gross proﬁt to selling expenses

Not available

a
1995 sales coverage data were available only by geographic region (northern, southern, and central) except for the three largest countries (Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom), for a total sample size of seven. To make comparisons with other periods, similar aggregate means are computed for geographic
areas in other periods as well.
b
Comparisons for 1994 versus 1996 and 1994 versus 1997 include data for each country involved in the transfer effort, rather than regional aggregates, for
a total sample size of 15.
c
Data for direct sales revenue in 1996 is available only in aggregate form, not broken down by country.

that is, to assess the degree to which the data may be
suggesting a causal relationship (Cook and Campbell
1979).
Such an approach is applicable to situations where
there is only one population and where the treatment
is applied, removed, and applied again to the entire
population (Cook et al. 1990). Although the researcher
is not expected to have control over the incidence
of the treatment, he or she is expected to know
precisely when the treatment occurred (Cook 1991).
The speciﬁc research design is known as a repeatedtreatment quasi experiment (Shadish et al. 2002) or
repeated-measures design (Trochim 2001, see Barlow
and Hersen 1984 for an application in psychology).
The quasi-experimental nature of the design increases
the need to carefully weigh potential alternative
explanations.
The explanatory power of the design, which is depicted below, hinges on the repeated incidence of the
treatment. X indicates application of the treatment,
and /X indicates its removal. The most interpretable
outcome occurs when O1 (the ﬁrst observation) differs
from O2 , O3 differs from O4 , and the O3 − O4 difference is in the same direction as the O1 − O2 difference.
O1 XO2 /XO3 XO4
The treatment in our study occurs when a template
is used in the transfer. When a template is used we
expect to see both higher adoption and better performance at the recipient unit than when a template is
Table 5

Correlation between Template Use and Knowledge Transfer
Effectiveness

Adoption
Performance
Template used?

Wave I

Wave II

Telesales

High
Successful
Yes

Low
Unsuccessful
No

High
Successful
Yes

not used. That is, we expect that O2 (adoption and
performance after Wave I) will be higher than O1
(adoption and performance prior to Wave I) and that
O4 (adoption and performance after Telesales) will
be higher than O3 . This is clearly consistent with the
evidence.

Alternative Explanations

We now consider alternative explanations for the
observed pattern of outcomes. In order for alternative explanations to template use to account for the
observed pattern they must follow the same pattern
as that of template use—that is, be applied, removed,
and applied again (Cook and Campbell 1979, Shadish
et al. 2002)—or there must be at least one plausible explanation for each of the three waves of the
experiment. To increase the chances of generating
a comprehensive set of alternative explanations, we
organized plausible alternatives following the quasiexperimental logic suggested by Cook and Campbell
(1979), categorizing the alternatives into selection,
maturation, history, attrition, instrumentation, and
testing (see Shadish et al. 2002, p. 55).12 Within these
categories we begin with the most plausible rival
explanation and continue in decreasing order of plausibility. Table 6 summarizes the alternative explanations and the arguments against them.
Selection: Systematic Differences in Conditions
Cause the Observed Effect
One potential alternative explanation is the use or
misuse of IT. In essence, Wave II may have failed by
12

There are other potential categories of alternative explanations,
such as ambiguous temporal precedence, regression to the mean,
and additive and interaction effects, which are not included here
because the repeated-treatment design renders them less relevant.
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Summary of Alternative Explanations

Explanation
Selection
Wave II and Telesales dependent on IT, not template.
Wave II did not utilize effectively, while Telesales did.

Pattern is due to differences in complexity and
subprocess interdependence.
Pattern due to differential expectations as to ease of
implementation and subsequent actions,
especially the use of pilot centers.
Pattern due to differences in pressure to
improve results.
Pattern due to differences in top-management support.
Pattern due to differing perceptions of initiative as
“good” or “bad” idea.
Maturation
Phase of business cycle caused the pattern.
Pattern due to general European business climate.
History
Pattern due to luck.
Pattern due to competitors’ situations.
Attrition
Pattern due to personnel turnover.
Instrumentation
Changes in the template or implemented practice
make it difﬁcult to tell if a template was used.

Counter-argument
Practice in Dubai consisted of nine interdependent subprocesses of which only three were
embedded in software. Moreover, template provided (1) idea for using software, (2) routines
for how to use software, and (3) routines for connecting software to non-IT-based
subroutines. Dubai clearly used as template outside of IT use.
Telesales similar to Wave II in complexity and subprocess interdependence.
The use of pilot centers underscores importance of templates because the template in Dubai
was clearly used to establish pilot centers, and pilot centers themselves were then explicitly
used as templates.
Level of pressure was similar for both Wave II and Telesales.
All three had top-management support, with Wave II having signiﬁcantly
more support than Telesales.
Idea for both Wave II and Telesales, 100% coverage, was identical. Moreover, template in
Telesales was explicitly used to persuade CBU management it was a “good” idea,
highlighting the value of templates.
The processes of treatment, removal of treatment, and retreatment did not coincide with natural
phases of the business cycle.
Aggregate GDP grew constantly from 1994 to 1997.
The serial pattern occurred simultaneously, albeit not necessarily independently, in 15 countries.
Pattern occurs similarly across 15 countries. Competitors’ situations not likely to be the same
nor to change simultaneously in all 15 countries.
No turnover in Team C and minimal turnover in CBU top management.
Process of implementing extracted key success factors provides a measure of similarity.
Description of Telesales implementation provides evidence of direct template use. Wave II
lacks template because overarching model not in use anywhere. Choice of model versus
independent and existing subprocesses made by ﬁrm.

Testing
Understanding of cause and effect after ﬁrst
treatment biases removal of treatment
and retreatment.

Actors didn’t understand nature of treatment until after entire experimental period was over,
and interest is in concrete actions, not psychological states.

not effectively utilizing IT, whereas Telesales was successful solely because of its innovative use of software. However, such an explanation belies the fact
that the Telesales transfer initiative succeeded not
simply because of the TeleMagic software. Indeed,
the template, as it existed at Dubai, provided not
only the software but also the idea and proof that
copy machines could be sold by telephone, the scripts
for how to sell copy machines by telephone, and
an example of all nine interdependent subprocesses
working concurrently in a single practice. Contact
software, including TeleMagic, was available publicly,
but it is unlikely that a third-party software vendor
could have provided the level of information necessary to re-create the superior results obtained by the
template site. Telesales was not reducible to software
alone as evidenced by the repeated iteration back to

Dubai to solve implementation problems unrelated
to IT.13
Connected to this potential explanation is one suggesting that the pattern arises from differences in the
level of complexity and interdependence among the
three initiatives. For instance, Wave I was simpler,
consisting of completely separate, modular practices
that were extensions of existing practices, requiring
only moderate levels of change. Wave II, on the other
hand, was made up of nine interdependent practices that had to be implemented in serial fashion,
13

An example of non-IT-related iteration occurred the ﬁrst time the
pilot was to make a Telesales call. That day Camarero and 29 senior
managers were on hand to make the ﬁrst telephone call, only to
ﬁnd out that they did not know what to say. How do you sell
expensive copy machines by telephone? As a result, they went back
to Dubai to obtain the telephone scripts.
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ultimately requiring a large change in existing routines—which caused the different results.14 The Telesales practice, however, effectively embodied the
Wave II model. Although somewhat less interdependent (embedding three of the nine interdependent modules in software), it still required the serial
implementation of seven interdependent modules
and resulted in the same large-scale change as did
Wave II. For complexity alone to be an alternative
explanation, one would have to argue that the point
of maximum complexity, beyond which a practice
cannot be effectively implemented, lies somewhere
between seven and nine serial, interdependent processes. Although theoretically possible, such a result
seems unlikely.
Alternatively, the pattern of success may be due
to Team C’s use of pilot centers during the Telesales
phase and not during Wave II. Although the pilot centers likely had an impact on knowledge transfer effectiveness for Telesales, this underscores rather than
negates the value of template use. One could argue
that, even with a complex practice, a pilot center is
easier to establish because one has tighter control and
may be able to engage in more rapid experimentation to achieve desired results. However, the practice
in Dubai was transferred to six pilot centers concurrently, all of which were successful within a short
period of time. The case description highlights the
speciﬁc role of the template in (1) persuading the
heads of CBUs to undertake a pilot and (2) providing a reference during the implementation of the pilot
centers as unforeseen problems arose. Furthermore,
the pilots were then used as templates during the process of transfer to the rest of the units. In a sense,
pilot centers may play a role of intermediate template. For instance, in this particular case there was
some question as to whether a practice from a small
city like Dubai would be relevant to large European
urban centers. The use of pilots allowed for additional
testing of the knowledge embedded in the template
routines before widespread implementation. Pilots as
intermediate templates highlight rather than undermine the argument that templates in general increase
the effectiveness of knowledge transfer.
Another potential explanation is that the CBUs
were under signiﬁcant pressure to improve sales revenue prior to Wave I and that the subsequent Wave I
success removed that pressure. Although this possibly
explains the lack of adoption of Wave II, Rank Xerox
continued to be under some, albeit less, pressure from
Xerox USA to improve performance. Moreover, the
same lower level of pressure to improve performance
14

This is similar to the concept of multiplicative relationships developed by MacDufﬁe (1995).
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held for the Telesales phase and for Wave II. Pressure would have to have been high for Wave I and
Telesales and low for Wave II for this explanation to
be the cause of the pattern of adoption noted in the
description.
The level of pressure for adoption is related to the
issue of top-management support. Potentially, Wave I
and Telesales enjoyed high top-management support,
whereas Wave II did not. This is not the case, however, because all three initiatives had signiﬁcant topmanagement support, with Wave II actually enjoying
more support than Telesales. Indeed, the year it was
launched, the CEO personally introduced Wave II as
one of the top priorities for the Rank Xerox western European countries, something he did not do for
Telesales. In addition, bonuses were tied to the implementation of Wave II, whereas they were not tied to
Telesales, suggesting somewhat lower support. This
indicates that the observed pattern was not due
to different levels of top-management support and
strengthens the case against differing degrees of pressure for adoption. Had there been an increase in pressure for adoption, one would expect to see increased
degrees of pressure or support from top management
during that wave. The fact that this did not occur during the Telesales phase weakens these two potential
explanations.
It may also be that the levels of adoption and
implementation resulted from a perception of the initiative as either a good or bad idea. However, the
idea of coverage was fundamental to both Wave II
and Telesales and dated to 1988—prior even to the
beginning of Wave I. As senior Team C member Olaf
Odlind pointed out, “In the beginning we didn’t have
Telesales     But we had from the beginning [the idea
of] 100% coverage of the buying window in the sales
process.” It is still possible that CBU management
may have perceived the embodiment of the idea, not
the coverage idea itself, as good and appropriate in
Telesales and not in Wave II, but such an argument
underscores the use of the Dubai template to prove
the efﬁcacy of the idea, something that could not be
done in Wave II because it had no template.
Maturation: Naturally Occurring Changes over
Time Cause the Observed Pattern
Although cyclical forces in the ﬁrm’s business cycle
may have caused the pattern of performance, it is
not likely. Each phase of the sequence of treatment,
removal of treatment, and treatment spanned multiple months and did not coincide with the natural business cycle. If this explanation had caused
the observed pattern, one would see speciﬁc segments, such as removal of the treatment, occurring
at times of the year when sales were typically low.
This does not occur. Furthermore, outside the interventions observed in the experiment, the main direc-

1726

Jensen and Szulanski: Template Use and the Effectiveness of Knowledge Transfer

tion and processes of the organization did not change
signiﬁcantly during the period of the experiment.
Alternatively, the pattern may have been caused
not by the business cycle speciﬁc to the ﬁrm but
by the general business climate in Europe. However,
aggregate GDP, after a slight decline of 0.37% in 1993,
rose consistently through the period, varying between
1.6% and 2.75% growth. Again, one would expect to
see a period of growth, decline, and growth coinciding with the timing of treatment, removal of treatment, and second treatment. This did not occur.
History: Concurrent Events Cause
the Observed Pattern
Another possibility may be that the observed pattern is due solely to chance. A simplistic analysis that
treats each “wave” as a transfer that either succeeds
or fails yields a total of eight possible success or failure patterns. Under such a scenario, the highest probability of observing the actual pattern by chance is
no higher than 15%, assuming a two-thirds probability of success for each transfer, and is 12% when
assuming a more realistic 0.5 probability of success.
At the other extreme, when each wave is conceived
as 15 independent transfers (one for each of the 15
countries), the probability of all 15 countries achieving success by chance (0.5 chance of success) in either
Wave I or Telesales alone is a negligible 0.00003 per
wave. Of course, there is likely to be some degree
of decision interdependence, although Rank Xerox
country managers, especially those heading country
units with natural European rivalries, enjoyed signiﬁcant autonomy from one another. A conservative
assumption would take into consideration the differing adoption rates observed in Waves I and II considering at least two separate groups: early and late
adopters. Even considering such high decision interdependence, the probability of the observed pattern
is lower than 0.02. Thus, it seems unlikely that chance
alone could explain the observed pattern.
A similar explanation is that the pattern of results
in the dependent variable is due mainly to competitors’ actions rather than to actions taken by Rank
Xerox. However, the pattern is observed simultaneously across 15 different countries and temporally
follows the application and removal of the treatment. For competitors to be the cause, one would
expect variable performance and timing of performance changes across the 15 countries, because competitors’ positions are not likely to be the same in all
locations.
Attrition: Loss of Respondents Causes
the Observed Effect
It may be possible that the results were achieved
because the individuals involved were not the same
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in each wave of the experiment, thereby creating differing performances by virtue of differing personnel.
However, Rank Xerox experienced only typical personnel changes during the period in question, with
no turnover in Team C and minimal attrition in top
CBU management.
Instrumentation: The Nature of the Measures
Changes over Time, Causing Confusion with
the Observed Effect
This threat to validity involves potential measurement
error in the independent variable. If change in the
template itself or adaptation of the practice during the
transfer process creates enough measurement error,
whether or not a template was “used” may be called
into question. However, each wave used the same
process, involving the codiﬁcation and transfer of
key success factors (codiﬁcation that clearly involved
the use of templates). The implementation of the
key success factors becomes a primary method for
judging the extent of implementation, providing a
rough measure of similarity to the original. Moreover,
the Telesales initiative provides further evidence that
the template was a critical part of implementation,
because there were multiple iterations back to Dubai
to address unforeseen questions.
Likewise, one may argue that Wave II consisted of
templates in the same way that Wave I did and that
the difference in outcome is a result of choosing the
level of analysis. Although Wave II, on one level, did
consist of independent practices, the Wave II model
required serially interdependent implementation of
all practices to be successful. In addition, the choice of
a serially interdependent model, one for which there
was not a template because the entire model was not
in use anywhere, was a choice made by the ﬁrm and
not the researchers, suggesting the appropriateness of
labeling Wave II as lacking a template.
Testing: Exposure to the First Treatment Affects
Results of Later Treatments
A typical threat in quasi experiments is testing, where
subjects discover the nature of the treatment from
their ﬁrst exposure and alter their later responses as
a result. This type of alternative explanation, however, is more viable in psychological tests where one is
measuring subjective states than it is in tests measuring the effect of concrete actions. The interest here is
in the possibility that an action resulted in an increase
in knowledge transfer effectiveness, whether or not
the subjects understood the cause-and-effect relationship at the time. Nevertheless, the actors involved in
the transfers did not understand the nature of the
treatment until after the experiment was over, minimizing testing as an alternative explanation.
Finally, we recognize that there may be unmeasured variables that account for the results. However,
the repeated treatment design helps to mitigate this.
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The fact that the result was replicated in the second
treatment, which was applied years after the ﬁrst treatment, signiﬁcantly enhances the possibility that the
results arise from the use of a template and not from
some other cause.
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A Measure of Template Use
Following Nelson and Winter (1982, pp. 119–120),
we deﬁned template use as reliance on an organizational practice that is currently in existence, observable, composed of a single or connected set of
processes, and consciously used in the replication process. According to this deﬁnition, a template was not
used in the Wave II initiative because it relied on
existing subroutines that were scattered throughout
Europe. Such a collection of practices does not constitute a template because those wishing to scrutinize the original could not ﬁnd the composite routine
working as a complete set in any one location. The
poor performance of Wave II suggests that attempts
to combine parts of existing routines may result in
decreased transfer effectiveness.
In light of this, the investigation of templates reported here contributes to the literature on the capabilities-based view of the ﬁrm. The ﬁndings suggest
that it may be difﬁcult to parlay a collection of small
practices or the modiﬁcation of an existing practice
into a core competence. This suggests a source of variance in combinative capabilities (Kogut and Zander
1992). Without a tangible instance of the “resource” or
“capability,” that is, without a template, the resource
may not really exist—at least not in a readily replicable form.

initiative. During Wave I the template was primarily
used as a reference by the source units and Team C
to codify the key success factors of the various practices. Iteration was infrequent because the practices,
once understood, were fairly simple to implement.
The Telesales initiative was larger and more complex
than Wave I, encompassing more people and several
interrelated subprocesses. As expected, the amount of
iteration between template and replica increased in
the Telesales wave.
The concept of templates as referents, then, suggests an explanation for the pattern of iteration
between original and copy that is seen in the data. It
does not explain, however, the variance in the pattern
of initiative adoption. Having access to a template
does not ensure that the template is used. A referent
is especially useful after implementation has begun.
The deﬁnition of a template, however, suggests
yet another mechanism of operation, that of persuasion. A template, in this usage, is something that
ought to be copied, such as an organizational practice being transferred because it consistently produces
superior results. It is synonymous with concepts such
as prototype, model, and exemplar, an “example or
model deserving imitation” (Oxford English Dictionary 1989). This suggests that the existence of a template may help initiate the transfer. Organizations
often have difﬁculty getting recipient units to adopt
new practices. The use of templates, as scholars in
the change management literature have suggested
(e.g., Armenakis and Harris 2002), helps overcome
resistance by demonstrating results and providing
evidence of efﬁcacy because someone else in the organization has already successfully used the practice.
Without a template there are no data on potential results and nothing to observe showing whether
an idea, a composite of previously unconnected routines, or signiﬁcant adaptation of an existing practice
will work as planned. Recipients have to rely on faith
rather than proof when making the decision to implement, thus lowering the incentive to adopt. In talking
about Wave II, Camarero described this problem as
follows:

The Roles of the Template: Referent and Persuader
Templates play the role of referents during the transfer process. Speciﬁcally, through closer scrutiny of
the original, templates are used to resolve problems
that arise during the replication attempt (Nelson and
Winter 1982, Winter and Szulanski 2001), the importance of which is likely to increase as routines become
more difﬁcult to transfer. The Rank Xerox example
illustrates exactly such a pattern. A template was used
more frequently as a referent during the Wave III—
Telesales initiative than during the simpler Wave I

What we did was to take pieces of the best practices
and create the perfect model that was seen as artiﬁcial because in reality it was artiﬁcial because nobody
had this thing. There is nothing new about [the pieces].
But this [model] is absolutely new. Nobody had done
it before, nobody had seen this model. So the reaction,
the human one, was, “Oh, I will not be able to implement this thing   ” But because they could not escape
that they had to do it they took the second way out
saying, “I’m going to do it,” with the clear intention
not to touch it.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our direct empirical investigation of template use and
the effectiveness of knowledge transfer contributes to
the literature on knowledge transfer, ﬁrm capabilities, and evolutionary economics. It does so primarily by yielding a replicable measure of template use
and providing empirical support for the fundamental
claim that template use enhances the effectiveness of
knowledge transfer. Furthermore, our ﬁeld evidence
allows us to complement extant knowledge by suggesting several roles that templates may play during
the transfer process.
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In contrast, concerning Wave III–Telesales, Camarero
said:
I took them [to Dubai] in order to get credibility,
because they look at you and they say “Dubai produces double?” They don’t like it. They don’t want to
believe it. This is the principal about best practices—
denial. [But] they went and talked to the people and
checked if it was true. It conﬁrmed the performance. So
what do you do after that? You have no choice but to
believe, even if you don’t want to believe. The results
are the results and nobody can go against that.

Therefore, because of demonstrable results and evidence of efﬁcacy, using a template is likely to increase
the likelihood that a transferred routine will be
adopted. As with the referent mechanism, the data in
the Rank Xerox case ﬁt this theorized pattern well.
Wave I and Telesales both used templates and were
adopted by all countries, whereas Wave II did not use
a template and was poorly adopted. The existence of
the templates and the published results they created
seemed critical to adoption. With all three initiatives
data from the practices (with Wave II this consisted of
data from the unconnected subprocesses) were explicitly used to persuade, and with Telesales this was combined with extensive observation of the template. With
all three initiatives recipient units were highly skeptical and initially unwilling to adopt the practices. With
Wave II they remained unconvinced, because the composite practice was nowhere in operation and there
were no data showing that the practice, in its totality,
was practicable. However, with Wave I and Telesales
the existence of data proving the successful results
of the working practices, as well as opportunities to
observe the practices, overcame the resistance.
Limitations and Future Research
Our conclusions are drawn from the study of a single
company and pertain speciﬁcally to sales practices.
It should be noted, however, that the type of bestpractice transfer process that Rank Xerox underwent,
internal benchmarking, is ubiquitous across industries, and its basic format is relatively independent of
the type of practice being transferred (Camp 1989).
Moreover, replicating superior templates is a fundamental mechanism underlying the growth of chain
and franchise organizations (Bradach 1998). Finally,
we are not aware of any characteristics of Rank Xerox
or of its served markets that would systematically
enhance or dampen the effect of using templates.
Hence, we expect the results to be applicable outside
of Rank Xerox.
Another limitation of our study is that, although we
can provide anecdotal evidence of the different mechanisms by which the template affects the effectiveness of the transfer, we cannot establish systematically
how and through which mechanisms the template

Management Science 53(11), pp. 1716–1730, © 2007 INFORMS

enhances the effectiveness of the transfer. This suggests the need to further examine the speciﬁc mechanisms through which templates affect the transfer
process.
As Teece (1998) points out, although there are
many potentially valid research issues that one could
identify in the management of knowledge assets,
there are several topics that are particularly salient
and warrant special attention. One of them is the
need to test whether ﬁrm-level competitive advantage
ﬂows fundamentally from difﬁcult-to-imitate knowledge assets. The analysis of Rank Xerox provides
some evidence that it does. Furthermore, it suggests
that substantial progress could be achieved in that
agenda by attending to the concept of templates.
In speciﬁc, the rich description of the Rank Xerox
example raises additional questions about templates
that deserve additional study. First is the possibility that templates serve two primary purposes: both
to persuade adoption and to overcome implementation difﬁculties during transfer. Are these the primary mechanisms through which templates operate?
In addition, the description of the Telesales phase
raises the possibility of intermediate templates. The
concept of intermediate templates raises questions of
whether and when they are needed when an original
template exists, their characteristics vis-à-vis original
templates, the nature of their intermediate role, and
how to deploy them effectively. Finally, the description of the Telesales phase also raises the possibility
that suitable templates may exist unnoticed in ﬁrms.
Although ﬁrms have lamented for years that they
often “don’t know what they know” (O’Dell et al.
1998), this study highlights the potential role of top
management in bringing such knowledge to light.
Although the idea that template use increases the
effectiveness of knowledge transfer has been a foundation of studies addressing the question of differential ﬁrm performance, much work is still needed to
understand the mechanisms through which successful transfer occurs.
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Appendix. Description of Wave I Practices
Customer retention

A plan to encourage current customers to repurchase equipment from Rank Xerox by providing
special incentives to salespeople for customer retention as well as technological database aids
for tracking customer equipment stocks, usage requirements, and contract expiration dates.

MajestiK

An initiative to increase market share in the European color copier market.

DocuTech

An initiative to sell offset printers to commercial and educational users by focusing on overall
document solutions rather than on traditional product or price selling.

New business
major accounts

A plan to establish salespeople whose sole responsibility is generating new business.

DocuPrint

A plan to accelerate sales of the newly launched line of high-speed network printers, particularly
to the banking and insurance industries, by emphasizing the product’s image printing
capabilities and systems integration features.

Competitive
machine in ﬁeld

An initiative for rapid updating of the Rank Xerox company-wide sales database to track
competitive information and provide salespeople with reliable leads.

Analyst time billing

A plan to sell the value-adding, problem-solving consulting services of Rank Xerox
technical analysts.

Facilities management
services

A plan to educate salespeople on how to sell facilities management services effectively through
the creation of simple packages and pricing options (i.e., Rank Xerox providing the customer
a packaged service consisting of both equipment and manpower).

Secondhand
centralized printers

An initiative to regain control of the secondhand market for centralized mainframe printers
(typically found in data centers) by repurchasing secondhand machines, refurbishing them,
and reselling them to very price-sensitive targeted accounts.
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